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Abstract. The tuple space coordination model is one of the most in-
teresting communication models for open distributed systems due to its
space and time decoupling and its synchronization power. Several works
have tried to improve the dependability of tuple spaces. Some have made
tuple spaces fault-tolerant, using mechanisms like replication and trans-
actions. Others have put the emphasis on security, with mechanisms like
access control and cryptography. However, many practical applications
in the Internet require both these dimensions. This paper describes how
a set of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tuple spaces can be used to
implement a dependable (distributed) tuple space. This tuple space is
dependable in a strong sense of the word: it is secure, fault-tolerant and
intrusion-tolerant, i.e. it behaves as expected even if some of the machines
that implement it are successfully attacked.
1 Introduction
The generative (aka tuple space) coordinationmodel, originally introduced
in the Linda programming language [12], uses a shared memory object called
a tuple space to support coordination between distributed processes. Tuple
spaces can support communication that is decoupled in time – processes do not
have to be active at the same time – and space – processes do not need to
know each others addresses [6]. The operations supported by a tuple space are
essentially the insertion of tuples (finite sequences of values) in the space, the
reading of tuples in the space and the removal of tuples from the space.
There has been some research about fault tolerance in the generative coor-
dination model, both in the construction of fault-tolerant tuple spaces [27,2] and
in application level fault tolerance mechanisms [15,18]. The objective of these
works is essentially to guarantee that (i.) the service provided by the tuple space
is available even if some of the servers that implement it crash and (ii.) the tu-
ple space state is valid, according to the semantics of application, even when
application processes crash. The main mechanism employed in providing (i.) is
replication, while (ii.) is ensured usually with transactions. There has been also
some research about secure tuple spaces (e.g. [17,5,9,26]). The goal of these
works is basically to guarantee that a malicious process does not execute tuple
space operations without permission, using access control mechanisms at space
and tuple level.
Those works on fault tolerance and security for tuple spaces have a narrow
focus in two senses: they consider only simple faults (crashes) or simple attacks
(invalid accesses); and they are about either fault tolerance or security.
This paper goes one step further by presenting a solution for secure and fault-
tolerant tuple spaces using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tuple spaces. The
solution is based on a clear definition of what is a dependable tuple space: one
that provides the dependability properties of reliability, availability, integrity and
confidentiality [1], despite the occurrence of arbitrary faults, including so called
Byzantine faults, like attacks and intrusions. Therefore, this work is part of an
ongoing effort on designing systems that tolerate both accidental and malicious
faults, an area dubbed intrusion tolerance [11,25].
The dependability properties are enforced using a layered architecture in
which each layer is responsible for providing one or more of these properties.
The resulting dependable tuple space is implemented in a set of distributed
servers using the state machine approach [20]. This approach guarantees
that the tuple space behaves according to its specification if up to a number
of these servers fail, either accidentally (e.g. by crashing) or maliciously (e.g.
by being attacked and starting to misbehave). Moreover, our construction also
tolerates accidental and malicious faults in an unbounded number of clients that
access the tuple space and provides security mechanisms for protecting itself
from unauthorized clients access. The general design is presented in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Dependable tuple space based on a set of COTS tuple space servers.
The paper has two main contributions. Firstly, it presents a definition of what
means for a tuple space to be dependable, in a strong sense of the word: secure,
fault-tolerant and intrusion-tolerant. Secondly, it presents how a dependable
tuple space can be implemented using a set of COTS tuple spaces through a non-
trivial combination of security and fault tolerance mechanisms: state machine
replication, space and tuple level access control, and cryptography to obtain
confidentiality. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work to present a
tuple space architecture that uses these mechanisms in a integrated way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some previous works
about dependability in tuple spaces. Section 3 provides a definition of a de-
pendable tuple space (in terms of dependability properties) and discusses the
mechanisms required to fulfill this definition. The dependable tuple space archi-
tecture is presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 present some final remarks.
2 Related Work
There is a large collection of works aiming to improve the dependability of the
tuple space coordination model through the extensive use of security or fault
tolerance mechanisms. In this section we briefly review some of these efforts.
Recently, several papers have proposed the integration of security mecha-
nisms in tuple spaces. These mechanisms are becoming more and more relevant
since the generative model is shifting its use base from parallel applications for
closed high-speed clusters to open heterogeneous distributed systems where se-
curity threats are common. Amongst the proposals already published, some try
to enforce security policies that depend on the application [17], while others
provide integrity and confidentiality through the implementation of access con-
trol at tuple space level [9], tuple level [26] or both [5]. However, none of these
works consider the availability of the tuple space, which is the objective of using
fault tolerance, neither propose a confidentiality scheme like the one used in this
paper.
An area of work on fault tolerance in tuple spaces aims to increase the depend-
ability of the coordination infrastructure – the tuple space – using replication.
Some of these works are based on the state machine approach [20] (e.g. [2]) while
others use quorum systems [16] (e.g.[27]). A more recent work proposes the use
of autonomic computing techniques to select in run time the best replication
scheme, aiming to improve the performance and availability [19]. However, all
of these proposals are concerned with crash failures ([19] uses a crash-recover
system model) and none of them regards the occurrence of malicious faults in
the system, the main requirement of intrusion tolerance.
Some works focus on providing fault tolerance mechanisms at application
level, providing features like transaction support [15]. These systems provide the
ACID properties (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability), i.e. they
guarantee that when executing a sequence of tuple space operations, either all
or none of these operations are executed. Another work proposes the mobile
coordination approach [18], where an application process can send part of its code
(called a coordination unit) to be executed in the tuple space server, ensuring
atomicity and consistency even in case of process failure. We recognize the need
for application level support for fault tolerance, however, in this paper we do
not enforce any of these mechanisms since in Byzantine-prone settings they are
problematic. For instance, if transactions are used, a malicious process can begin
and abort transactions all the time affecting the liveness of the application. Our
approach (for now) is to try to develop more elaborated algorithms that do not
require this kind of application level support (like the ones presented in [3]).
Recently, we developed novel replication algorithms for the first Byzantine-
resilient tuple space – BTS [4]. This work proposes an efficient Byzantine-resilient
tuple space that requires Byzantine agreement only for the inp() operation and
provides weak shared memory semantics (does not satisfy linearizability [14]).
The work presented here differs from BTS in at least three important ways: it
presents a clear definition of what is a dependable tuple space; it presents a
complete solution for building a dependable tuple space (BTS does not include
access control and does not guarantee confidentiality); and it is based on Byzan-
tine state machine replication (BTS is based on Byzantine quorum systems [16]).
3 Defining a Dependable Tuple Space
A tuple space can be seen as a shared memory object that provides operations
for storing and retrieving ordered data sets called tuples. A tuple t with all its
fields defined is called an entry, and can be inserted in the tuple space using
the out(t) operation. A tuple in the space is read using the operation rd(t),
where t is a template, i.e. a special tuple in which some of the fields can be
wild-cards or formal fields (e.g. ?v, meaning the variable v will take the value
read). The operation rd(t) returns any tuple in the space that matches the
template, i.e. any tuple with the same number of fields and with the field values
equal to all corresponding defined values in t. A tuple can be read and removed
from the space using the in(t) operation. The in and rd operations are blocking.
Non-blocking versions, inp and rdp, are also usually provided.
In this paper, we provide another operation usually not considered by most
tuple space works: cas(t, t) [2,22]. This operation works like an indivisible ex-
ecution of the code: if ¬rdp(t) then out(t) (t is a template and t an entry).
The operation inserts t in the space iff rdp(t) does not return any tuple, i.e.
iff there is no tuple that matches t currently in the space. The cas operation is
important mainly because a tuple space that supports it is capable of solving the
consensus problem [22], which is a building block for solving many important
distributed synchronization problems like atomic commit, total order multicast,
leader election and fault-tolerant mutual exclusion. This also means that such a
tuple space is an universal shared memory object [13], i.e. it can implement any
other shared memory object.
3.1 Dependability Attributes
A tuple space is dependable if it satisfies the dependability attributes [1]. Like
in many other systems, some of these attributes do not apply or are orthogonal
to the core of the design (e.g. safety and maintainability). The relevant attributes
in this case are:
– Reliability: the operations on the tuple space have to behave according to
their specification.
– Availability: the tuple space has to be ready to execute requested opera-
tions.
– Integrity: no improper alteration of the tuple space can occur.
– Confidentiality: the content of (some) tuple fields cannot be disclosed to
unauthorized parties.
The difficulty of guaranteeing these attributes comes from the occurrence of
faults, either due to accidental causes (e.g. a software bug that crashes a server)
or malicious causes (e.g. an attacker that modifies some tuples in a server).
The objective is to avoid that these faults cause the failure of the tuple space,
i.e. that one or more of the four attributes above are violated. Malicious faults
are particularly naughty since it is hard to make assumptions about what the
attacker can and cannot do [25]. These faults are usually modeled in terms of
the most generic class of faults – arbitrary or Byzantine faults – so the solution
we propose here is quite generic in terms of the faults it handles.
The meaning of reliability and availability should be clear, but integrity and
confidentiality need some discussion. An alteration of the tuple space is said
to be proper (vs. improper) if and only if (i.) it is the outcome of one of the
operations out , in or inp; and (ii.) the operation satisfies the access policy of
the tuple space. A basic access policy must define which processes are allowed
to execute which operations in a tuple space. The most simple and effective
way to provide this is defining who can insert tuples in a tuple space and, for
each tuple inserted, who can read and who can remove it. A more elaborated
access policy is used to allow or disallow the execution of operations in the tuple
space depending on three types of parameters: the identifier of the invoker; the
operation and its arguments; the tuples currently in the space. An example
access policy stated informally might be: Allow only (i.) any rd/rdp operation
and (ii.) any out operation invoked by clients p1 or p2 with the first field with a
positive integer. We call these policies fine-grained because they allow the use
of a considerable variety of parameters [17,3]. Access policies are important to
prevent unauthorized clients from removing or reading tuples from the space, and
to prevent malicious clients from flooding the tuple space with large quantities
of tuples with the objective of causing a denial of service [5].
This discussion also helps clarifying the meaning of the confidentiality at-
tribute. The general idea is that the content of a tuple cannot be disclosed
except for an operation that satisfies the tuple space’s access policy. This policy
defines who are the authorized (vs. unauthorized) parties for each operation.
The idea is slightly more complicated though: confidentiality may be requested
for some fields but not for others (details below).
3.2 Dependability Mechanisms
The dependability of the tuple space is enforced using a combination of several
mechanisms. The most basic mechanism used to implement a dependable tuple
space is replication: the tuple space is maintained copied in a set of n servers
in such a way that the failure of some of them (that we will call faulty) does not
impair the reliability, availability and integrity of the system. The idea is that if
some of the servers fail (e.g. by crashing of by being controlled by an attacker
and behaving maliciously), the tuple space is still ready (availability) and the
operations work correctly (reliability and integrity) because the correct (i.e. not
faulty) replicas manage to overcome the misbehavior of the faulty replicas. There
is obviously a bound on the number of replicas f that can fail, which depends
on the replication solution used.
Another fundamental dependability mechanism, specially for maintaining in-
tegrity and confidentiality, is access control. This kind of mechanism is needed
to prevent unauthorized clients from inserting (out) removing (in, inp) or read-
ing tuples (rd , rdp) from the tuple space. Access control is usually implemented
in replicated servers using a reference monitor implementing the same access
policy in each server.
A third type of mechanism is cryptography, which is used to ensure the
reliability of the communication and the confidentiality of the tuples. Enforcing
confidentiality in a replicated tuple space is not simple for several reasons. The
first is that we cannot trust the servers to guarantee the confidentiality of the
tuples because f servers can fail, possibly disclosing tuples stored there. The
second is the need for matching tuples. Encrypted fields in general cannot be
compared with fields in a template. Some access policies can also impose limits
on the fields that are encrypted. Therefore we define three kinds of fields: public
fields whose content can be disclosed and compared; private fields whose content
cannot be disclosed neither compared; comparable fields whose content cannot
be disclosed but that allow simple equality comparisons.
4 Building a Dependable Tuple Space
This section presents the design of a dependable tuple space that satisfies the
definition in the previous section. We begin with a model of the underlying
system, then delve into the details of the implementation.
4.1 System Model
The system is composed by an infinite set of clients Π = {p1, p2, p3, ...} which
interact with a set of n servers U = {s1, s2, ..., sn} that implement a dependable
tuple space with the properties introduced in the previous section. We consider
that each client and each server has an unique id.
All communication between clients and servers is made over reliable au-
thenticated point-to-point channels. These channels can be implemented
on common networks, including the Internet, using for instance the SSL proto-
col. A side effect of having this channel is that each client pi has a shared key
kij with each server sj . This key is used in the confidentiality mechanism.
We assume that an arbitrary number of clients and a bound of up to f servers
can be subject to Byzantine failures, i.e. they can deviate arbitrarily from the
algorithm they are specified to execute and work in collusion to corrupt the
system behavior. Our architecture requires n ≥ 3f + 1 servers to tolerate the
aforementioned f faulty servers. This ratio between n and f is the best that
can be attained in practical systems (like Internet) for implementing Byzantine-
resilient active replication [7]. Clients that do not follow their algorithm in some
way are said to be faulty. A client that is not faulty is said to be correct.
We assume fault independence for servers, i.e. the probability of each server
failing is independent of another server being faulty. This assumption can be
substantiated in practice using hardware and software diversity [10,8], therefore
each server should have a different COTS tuple space.
4.2 Architecture Overview
Our dependable tuple space architecture consists in a series of integrated layers
for satisfying each one of the dependability properties stated in Section 3. Figure
2 presents the dependable tuple space architecture with all its layers.
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Fig. 2. Dependable tuple space architecture
On the top of the client-side stack is the application that uses the space, while
on the top of the server-side stack is the COTS tuple space. The communication
follows a scheme similar to remote procedure calls. The application interacts
with the system by calling functions with the usual signatures of tuple space’s
operations: out(t), rd(t), . . . These functions are implemented by a stub. The
layer below handles tuple level access control (Section 4.5). After, there is a
layer that takes care of confidentiality (Section 4.4) and then one that handles
replication (Section 4.3). The server-side is similar, except that there is a new
layer to check the access policy for each operation requested (policy-enforcement,
Section 4.6). The skeleton (or server-side stub) calls the operations on the COTS
tuple space. Since no known COTS tuple space available today supports the cas
operation, this operation has to be implemented by the skeleton. This layer
translates each call to cas(t, t) in two operations: when a request is received,
first rdp(t) is executed and if this operation returns false, out(t) is executed.
4.3 Replicated Tuple Space
In Section 3 we argued that the most basic mechanism for making the tuple
space dependable is replication. The idea is to replicate the tuple space in n
servers, i.e. to put a COTS tuple space in each of the n servers and to guarantee
some kind of consistency of these n replicas. A simple solution is to use ac-
tive replication based on the state machine approach [20]. This approach
guarantees linearizability [14], which is a strong form of consistency in which all
replicas take the same sequence of states.
The state machine approach requires that all replicas (i.) start in the same
state and (ii.) execute all requests (i.e. tuple space operations) in the same or-
der [20]. The first point is easy to ensure, e.g. by starting the tuple space with
no tuples. The second requires a fault-tolerant total order reliable multi-
cast protocol, which is the crux of the problem. Some protocols of this kind
that tolerate Byzantine faults are available in the literature (e.g. [7]). The state
machine approach also requires that the replicas are deterministic, i.e. that the
same operation executed in the same initial state generates the same final state
in every replica. This implies that a read (or removal) in different servers in the
same state (i.e. with the same set of tuples) must return the same response. This
constrains the use of COTS tuple spaces since the original definition does not
require these operations to be deterministic [12]. However, if the COTS tuple
spaces used are not deterministic, determinism can be emulated using abstract
specifications and abstraction functions [8].
State machine replication guarantee some of the dependability attributes we
desire. The system is available if up to f servers fail; the integrity and reliability
are kept if up to f servers fail because a vote is made with the results returned
by the servers [20].
The protocol executed by the replication layer in the client and server sides
is in Algorithm 1. The algorithm assumes the existence of a total order multi-
cast protocol. To multicast a message m using this protocol, the algorithm calls
function TO-multicast(U,m). On the other hand, the total order multicast pro-
tocol calls the function TO-receive(p,m) to receive a message m delivered by
the communication network.
The client part of the replication protocol is very simple. All operations are
executed by the client through a call to the execute op procedure passing the
operation name (OUT, RDP, INP, CAS, RD or IN) and the arguments of the
operation. In this procedure, the client issues the request operation to all n
servers using the total order multicast communication primitive (line 7). Then
it waits for replies until some response can be extracted from the reply vector
R (lines 12-13). In standard (Byzantine-tolerant) active replication protocols,
a response will be accepted if it is replied by at least f + 1 distinct servers,
thus ensuring that some correct server replied this response. However, in our
system, the confidentiality layer (next section) will impose different constraints
on a request result extraction.
The server side of the replication protocol is activated when the total order
multicast protocol delivers a message. In the first part of the algorithm (lines
Algorithm 1 Replicated Tuple Space protocols (client pi and server sj).
{Client}
procedure out(t)
1: execute op(OUT, t)
procedure rdp(t)
2: return execute op(RDP, t)
procedure inp(t)
3: return execute op(INP, t)
procedure cas(t, t)
4: return execute op(CAS, 〈t, t〉)
procedure rd(t)
5: return execute op(RD, t)
procedure in(t)
6: return execute op(IN, t)
procedure execute op(op, arg)
7: TO-multicast(U, 〈op, t〉)
8: R[1...n]← ⊥
9: repeat
10: receive(sj , 〈RESP, rs〉)
11: R[j]← rs
12: r ← extract response(R)
13: until r 6= ⊥
14: return r
{Server}
ts: server side upper layer
upon TO-receive(pi, 〈op, arg〉)
15: if op = OUT then
16: t← arg
17: ts.out(t)
18: tr ← t
19: else if op = CAS then
20: t← arg[0]
21: t← arg[1]
22: tr ← ts.cas(t, t)
23: else if op = IN ∨ op = INP then
24: tr ← ts.inp(arg)
25: else if op = RD ∨ op = RDP then
26: tr ← ts.rdp(arg)
27: end if
28: if tr = NM∧ (op = IN∨ op = RD) then
29: add blocked(op, pi, t)
30: else
31: send(pi, 〈RESP, tr〉)
32: end if
33: if op = OUT∨(op = CAS∧tr = t) then
34: notify blocked(t)
35: end if
15-27) the required operation is executed by the server in its upper layer ts. This
call will eventually reach the COTS tuple space skeleton of this replica (see Fig-
ure 2). Notice that the blocking operations of the COTS tuple space are never
called, to avoid blocking the server. When a blocking operation is requested, its
non-blocking version is executed (lines 23-27) and if it is not successful because
there is no matching tuple (tr = NM) the operation is stored in a set of pend-
ing operations for future execution (lines 28-29). If the requested operation is
executed, a response is sent back to the client (line 31). Finally, if some tuple
is inserted in ts, the procedure notify blocked checks if some pending operation
can be executed (lines 33-35).
4.4 Adding Confidentiality
Replication is often seen not as a helper but as an impediment for confidentiality.
The reason is easy to understand: if secret information is stored not in one
but in several servers, it probably becomes easier for an attacker to get it, not
harder. Therefore, the enforcement of confidentiality in a replicated tuple space
is not trivial. Several solutions that come to mind simply do not work or are
unacceptable for the generative coordination model. One solution would be for
each client to encrypt the tuples it inserts, but it would require the distribution
of a decryption key to any client that might read or remove the tuple. Another
solution would be for the servers to encrypt the tuples, but a malicious server
would be capable of disclosing any tuple. In fact, all previously proposed tuple
space confidentiality mechanisms [26,5] are useless in our system model since
they assume a trusted tuple space.
The solution we propose follows in some way the idea of letting the servers
handle the confidentiality. However, instead of trusting each server to keep the
confidentiality of the tuple fields, we trust a set of servers. The solution is based
on a (n, k)–publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme (PVSS) [21], with k =
f + 1. Each server si has a private key xi and a public key yi. The clients
know the public keys of all servers. Clients play the role of the dealer of the
scheme, encrypting tuple fields with the public keys of each server and obtaining
a set of field shares (function share). Any tuple field can be decrypted with
k = f + 1 shares (function combine), therefore a collusion of malicious servers
cannot disclose the contents of confidential tuple fields (we assume at most f
servers can be faulty).
The confidentiality scheme has also to handle the problem of matching (pos-
sibly encrypted) tuples with templates. When a client calls out(t) it chooses one
of three types of protection for each tuple field:
– public: the field is not encrypted so it can be compared arbitrarily (e.g. if
it belongs to a range of values) but its content may be disclosed4;
– comparable: the field is encrypted but a cryptographic hash of the field is
also stored so equality comparisons are possible (details below);
– private: the field is encrypted and no hash is stored so its content cannot
be disclosed and no comparisons are possible.
A collision-resistant hash function H(v) (e.g. SHA-256) maps an arbi-
trarily length input to a fixed length output, satisfying two properties: it is
computationally infeasible to find two values v 6= v′ such that H(v) = H(v′)
(collision resistance); given an output it is computationally infeasible to find
an input that produces that output (unidirectionality). We informally call the
output of such function a hash.
The idea behind comparable fields is the following. Suppose client p1 wants to
insert in the space a tuple t with a single comparable field f1. p1 sends t encrypted
and H(f1) to the servers. Suppose later a client p2 calls, without loss of generality,
rd(t) and the tuple space needs to check if t and t match. p2 calculates H(f1)
and sends it to tuple space that verifies if this hash match H(f1). This scheme
works for equalities but clearly does not work with more complex comparisons
like inequalities. The scheme has another limitation. Although hash functions are
unidirectional, if the range of values that a field can take is known and limited,
then a brute-force attack can disclose its content. Suppose a field takes 32 bit
values. An attacker can simply calculate the hashes of all 232 possible values to
4 It may be needed, for example, in fine-grained policy enforcement (Section 4.6).
discover the hashed value. This limitation is a motivation for not using typed
fields in a dependable tuple spaces. Also, the limitation of comparable fields is
the reason why we also define private fields: no hash is sent to the servers so
comparisons are impossible but their content cannot be disclosed.
Algorithm 2 Confidentiality Layers (client pi and server sj).
{Client}
ts: client side replication layer
procedure out(t)
1: ts.out(mask(t))
procedure rdp(t)
2: return ts.rdp(fingerprint(t))
procedure inp(t)
3: return ts.inp(fingerprint(t))
procedure cas(t, t)
4: t
′ ← fingerprint(t)
5: t′ ← mask(t)
6: return ts.cas(t
′
, t′)
procedure rd(t)
7: return ts.rd(fingerprint(t))
procedure in(t)
8: return ts.in(fingerprint(t))
procedure mask(t)
9: th ← fingerprint(t)
10: 〈s1, ..., sn,PROOF t〉 ← share(t)
11: s← 〈E(s1, ki1), ...,E(sn, kin)〉
12: return th.s.PROOF t
procedure fingerprint(t = 〈f1, ..., fm〉)
13: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m do
14: f ′i ←

∗ if fi = *
fi if fi is public or formal
H(fi) if fi is comparable
PR if fi is private
15: end for
16: return 〈f ′1, ..., f ′m〉
{Server}
ts: server side upper layer
procedure out(t)
17: ts.out(unmask(t))
procedure rdp(t)
18: return ts.rdp(t. ∗ .∗)
procedure inp(t)
19: return ts.inp(t. ∗ .∗))
procedure cas(t, t)
20: return ts.cas(t. ∗ .∗, unmask(t))
procedure unmask(th.s.PROOF t)
21: si ← D(s[j], kij)
22: PROOF i ← prove(s,PROOF t)
23: return th.si.PROOF i
This confidentiality scheme is implemented by the confidentiality layers in
client and server sides. The algorithms for these layers are presented in Algorithm
2. Both the client-side and the server-side layers have one procedure to process
each tuple space operation. In the client (viz. server), these procedures are called
by the layer above (viz. below) the confidentiality layer. In the client (viz. server),
the confidentiality layer calls the layer below (viz. above) using a pseudo-object
ts (see the algorithm, top/left).
The confidentiality layers simply make transformations to the tuples and
templates that are sent and received. In the client side, templates used to read
or remove a tuple are transformed in a fingerprint (lines 2-8). The idea is to
transform each tuple field according to its kind (see lines 13-15). Private fields
are simply substituted by a constant PR since no match is possible. Also in the
client side, tuples to be inserted using out or cas are masked, i.e. the content of
each of its fields is protected from disclosure depending on its kind (lines 9-12).
This procedure starts by obtaining a fingerprint of the tuple (line 9), then uses
the PVSS scheme to obtain shares of the tuple (line 10) and encrypts each share
with the secret key shared by the client and each of the servers (line 11). The
PVSS scheme also generates a proof PROOF t that the shares are really shares
of the tuple (line 10). The encrypted shares and PROOF t are concatenated (‘.’
operator) with the fingerprint of the tuple and passed to replication layer.
In the server side, tuples to be inserted are unmasked (lines 17, 20-23), i.e.
the tuple share corresponding to the server is decrypted with the key shared
with the client (line 21), a proof that the share is correct is generated (line 22),
and these two informations are concatenated with the tuple fingerprint (line 23).
Templates are simply passed to the upper layer concatenated with two wild-card
fields (‘*’) with the objective of reading some tuple that matches the template
fingerprint whatever its share and proof (lines 18-20). Blocking operations do
not appear because the server-side replication layer never calls them.
The replication algorithm in the previous section, used an extract response
procedure to obtain the result of an operation (line 12 of Algorithm 1). We did
not explain the functioning of the procedure in that section since it was related
to the confidentiality scheme. Now, the functioning of the procedure should be
clear. The procedure verifies if the shares already received are correct; if f+1 are,
then it combines the shares and obtains the original tuple. There is a possibility
that the tuple obtained does not satisfy the template used to read/remove it:
the client that introduced it might be malicious and have introduced a tuple
with hashes of the comparable fields that were not really hashes of those fields.
When that happens, if the client only read the tuple, it has to send the tuple
and the proofs to the servers (using total order multicast) so that they discard
the tuple. Then, the operation has to be repeated.
4.5 Access Control
Access control has been shown to be a fundamental security mechanism for
tuple spaces [5]. For controlling tuple and space access we do not choose any
specific access control model to allow the use of different implementations in
different applications. For instance, access control lists (ACLs) might be used
for closed systems, but some type of role-based access control (RBAC) might
be more suited for open collaborative systems [24]. To accommodate these dif-
ferent mechanisms in our dependability architecture, access control mechanisms
are defined in terms of credentials: each tuple space TS has a set of required
credentials CTS and each tuple t has two sets of required credentials Ctrd and
Ctin. To insert a tuple in a tuple space TS, a client must provide credentials that
match CTS . Analogously, to read (resp. remove) a tuple t from a space, a client
must provide credentials that match Ctrd (resp. C
t
in).
The credentials needed for inserting a tuple in TS are defined by the ad-
ministrator that configures the tuple space. If ACLs are used, we can have, e.g.
CTS = {p1, p2}, i.e., CTS is the set of processes allowed to insert tuples in
TS. Analogously, with ACLs the credentials Ctrd and C
t
in associated with tuple t
would be the sets of processes allowed to read and remove the tuple, respectively.
The implementation of access control in our architecture is done in the ac-
cess control layers in the clients and servers, as show in Figure 2. In the client
side, when an out or a cas operation are invoked, the associated credentials Ctrd
and Ctin are appended to the tuple as two public fields. Additionally, the client
credentials are appended as another public field of the tuple, either if the tuple
is a entry (out or cas) or a template (cas and read/remove operations).
In the server side layer, each (correct) server tests if the operation can be
executed. If the operation is a tuple insertion, say t, client credentials (appended
to t) must be sufficient for inserting t in the space. If this condition holds, t is
inserted in the space (with its associated required credentials Ctrd and C
t
in as
public fields). If the requested operation is a read/remove, the credentials asso-
ciated with the template t passed, must be sufficient for executing the operation.
In practice the server side layer may have to read several tuples from the COTS
tuple space to find one that can be read/removed by the client. This reading of
several tuples may be supported by the COTS tuple space (e.g. the scan opera-
tion in TSpaces [23]) or may have to be implemented in the skeleton. If several
tuples are read, they have to be checked in the same deterministic order in all
servers, in order to guarantee that all correct servers choose the same.
Notice that a faulty server can return a tuple even if a client has no permission
to read it. However, the confidentiality scheme does not allow a tuple returned
by less than f + 1 distinct servers to be read, so malicious servers cannot reveal
a tuple to unauthorized clients. A faulty server can also store a tuple inserted by
a client that has no permission to do it. This tuple will not be read by correct
clients for the same reason.
4.6 Policy Enforcement
In a recent paper we have shown that tuple spaces that implement a more generic
form of access control – policy-enforced tuple spaces – have interesting properties
for the coordination of clients that can fail in a Byzantine (or arbitrary) way
[3]. For instance, we have provided two universal constructions, which allow
the implementation of any shared-memory object using a tuple space. Here we
describe how policy enforcement is implemented in our tuple space in the policy
enforcement layer (see Figure 2).
The idea behind policy enforcement is that the tuple space is governed
by a fine-grained access policy. This kind of policies take into account the
already mentioned three types of parameters: identifier of the invoker; operation
and arguments; tuples currently in the space. The application of these ideas for
securing tuple spaces was first proposed in [17].
An example policy is in Figure 3. Operations without rules are prohibited so
this policy allows only rd and out operations. The rule for rd states that any rd
invoked is executed. The rule for out states that only tuples with two values can
be inserted and only if there is no tuple in the space with the same second value
as the one that the invoker is trying to insert.
Tuple Space state TS
Rrd: execute(rd(t)) :- invoke(p, rd(t))
Rout: execute(out(〈a, b〉)) :- invoke(p, out(〈a, b〉)) ∧ ∀c : 〈a, c〉 /∈ TS
Fig. 3. Example access policy.
A tuple space has a single access policy. It can be defined in several ways, e.g.
during the system setup by the system administrator. Whenever an operation
invocation is received in a server, there is a verification if the operation satisfies
the access policy of the space in the policy enforcement layer. The verification
itself is a simple local computation of a condition expressed in the rule of the
operation invoked. When an operation is rejected the server returns an error
code to the invoker. The client only accepts the rejection if it receives f + 1
copies of the same error code.
5 Final Remarks
In this paper, we presented an integrated architecture for an intrusion-tolerant
tuple space. This construction based on COTS tuple spaces satisfies a set of
important dependability attributes: reliability, integrity, availability and confi-
dentiality.
As future work, we plan to investigate the support for transactions in our
dependable tuple space. This might be an interesting mechanism for supporting
some applications, although the problem is far from trivial when malicious faults
are possible. We also plan to implement the dependable tuple space and assess
its performance, possibly making a comparison with quorum-based solutions.
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